A survey of economists conducted by the Central Bank of Russia indicates how far the rouble could weaken by the end of the year, to about 101 roubles per dollar. A similar benchmark underpinned calculations by the Institute of Economic Forecasting at the Russian Academy of Sciences (IEF RAS) to determine whether rouble devaluation could offset the country’s losses in oil and gas revenues. Given the exchange-rate dynamics and oil prices recorded in 2025, those losses have nearly reached 4 trillion roubles, according to expert estimates. The short answer: even 100 roubles to the dollar will not resolve the increasingly acute budget problems. Exporters, however, would benefit from a weaker currency. The cost will instead be borne through declining household incomes and slower economic growth, unless Russia significantly accelerates import substitution on a far larger scale than before.
Any discussion of the optimal exchange rate for Russia increasingly resembles the parable of the blind men and the elephant: it all depends on which side of the issue you approach.
Urals crude, the price of which underpins Russia’s budget calculations, remains far cheaper than the government assumed in its projections, both in dollar and rouble terms.
The average annual price of Urals in 2025 was about $56 per barrel, with an average exchange rate of 83 roubles to the dollar, meaning a barrel of Russian oil cost roughly 4,600 roubles. Toward the end of 2025, however, Urals even slipped below $40 per barrel. In February this year the price edged up to $44.60, according to the Ministry of Economic Development.
By contrast, the government’s baseline forecast initially assumed that in 2025 Urals crude would cost 6,700 roubles per barrel, or $69.70 at an exchange rate of 96.5 roubles to the dollar. The Ministry of Economic Development later revised its estimate to around 5,000 roubles per barrel, or $58 at an exchange rate of 86 roubles to the dollar.
Such a gap between forecasts and reality has led experts to conclude that if oil prices fail to remain at a level suitable for the budget, the authorities may quietly allow the exchange rate to weaken to levels that would compensate for the shortfall in export revenues.
The impact of the events in the Middle East that erupted in late February and early March remains uncertain. A macroeconomic survey conducted by the Central Bank between March 6 and March 10 among leading analytical centres showed that, compared with 2025, experts expect both renewed strengthening of the rouble in 2026 (to 79 roubles to the dollar) and a significant weakening, to 101 roubles to the dollar. That is the range of forecasts. The median (the value above and below which 50% of respondents placed their forecasts) stands at 84 roubles to the dollar.
At the end of last week, the Central House of Scientists in Moscow hosted a meeting of the Economic Management Section devoted to the rouble’s exchange rate. Economists discussed the implications of both a stronger currency and a hypothetical weakening.
According to calculations presented by Mikhail Gusev, head of a laboratory at the Institute of Economic Forecasting of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the rouble’s strengthening over the past year from an average of 93 to 80 roubles per dollar, coupled with a decline in the export price of oil from $60 to $40 per barrel, has led to a loss of 3.8 trillion roubles in oil and gas budget revenues.
Based on these initial assumptions, the economist assessed the potential effects of the frequently discussed weakening of the national currency to 100 roubles to the dollar.
It turns out that even such a devaluation would not fully compensate for the loss of oil and gas revenues. Assuming that oil prices do not rise significantly or remain elevated for long, weakening the rouble to this level would increase oil and gas revenues by only about 1.8 trillion roubles, according to the expert’s estimates.
The overall response of the Russian economy, however, would depend crucially on how domestic consumers react, specifically how demand for more expensive imports changes following such a devaluation.
‘If the share of imports in consumption does not decline, this will lead to a contraction in GDP, an economic downturn and faster inflation,’ Gusev said.
According to his calculations, GDP growth could be 2.9 percentage points lower. For example, in 2026, instead of the government’s baseline forecast of 1.3% growth, the economy would contract by 1.6%. Inflation, meanwhile, could rise by 3.3 percentage points: rather than the expected 4% in 2026, it would exceed 7%.
The reasons include a sharp increase in the cost of imports and the inability of companies to replace them, not only consumer goods but also the equipment and technologies businesses need for their operations.
In that case, the expert believes, there would also be a risk of a shortfall in non-oil budget revenues due to the economic downturn.
The economy would respond differently if a weaker rouble led to a decline in the share of imports in consumption and if the lost imports were replaced by domestic production, in other words, if a new round of import substitution were to begin, and on a far larger scale than before.
In that case, economic growth could accelerate by 2.5 percentage points, which in 2026 would translate into GDP growth of about 3.8%. Budget revenues would also increase, primarily through higher non-oil revenues. At the same time, however, inflation would accelerate as well, even more sharply than in the first scenario, by 4.8 percentage points, which in 2026 would mean inflation of around 9%.
The problem of import substitution remains acute. Surveys of industrial companies show that domestic producers have yet to find, within Russia, a sufficient number of alternative suppliers of components and equipment that meet the required quality standards.
In attempting to replace sanctioned imported equipment, companies are increasingly forced to opt for Chinese equivalents, creating the same risks of excessive dependence on a single external supplier that previously arose when purchasing from Western Europe (see NG, March 11, 2026).
Accelerating the domestic development of homegrown alternatives (components, equipment and technologies) requires time, labour and a favourable investment climate. This implies access to financing as well as guarantees of returns in the form of solvent demand.
Most importantly, as Gusev warned, consumers would bear the brunt in both scenarios he outlined: for them, devaluation effectively becomes another ‘tax’. ‘In all cases there is a reduction in real household incomes and household consumption,’ Gusev explained. ‘A weaker rouble may improve the financial position of exporters, but the Russian consumer will ultimately pay the price.’
Origin: NG.RU / Для российского бюджета 100 рублей за доллар – не панацея
