It is virtually impossible to pull the country out of a fuel crisis while inadequately protected infrastructure remains under constant attack. Russians are asking why protective structures have still not been built around fuel storage facilities and oil refineries. Such protection has long been in place in Arab countries. Russian officials say the authorities and companies are working continuously to improve the security of refineries. Yet executives at oil companies often do not know how to install anti-drone nets without risking prosecution for regulatory violations.
Russia’s Energy Ministry announced plans to develop protection for oil refineries two and a half years ago. ‘The issue of security is, of course, being discussed, and work is under way. Our colleagues have also put forward a legislative initiative. If some equipment breaks down, we can always redirect fuel flows. The main thing is for Russian Railways not to let us down,’ Artyom Verkhov, director of the Energy Ministry’s Department for Gas Industry Development, told the Federation Council in March 2024. ‘We are working together, including with colleagues from the Russian National Guard, on measures to protect facilities and install the necessary defence systems, such as the Pantsir,’ he said. (See Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 21, 2024.)
Since 2024, attacks on Russia’s fuel infrastructure have intensified considerably. Ukrainian drones have damaged dozens of energy facilities, leading to an obvious fuel shortage in the country. The government banned petrol exports and began buying fuel from other countries. But the shortage persists despite substantial price swings.
The authorities and Russian companies are continuously working to improve the protection of oil refineries, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak says. He recently spoke about efforts to stabilise fuel supplies as the market enters ‘a second stage of heightened tensions’
‘The current situation is constantly changing. Several refineries have already resumed operations, so taking logistics into account, we expect supply volumes to increase. The situation changes every day. We monitor it continuously and make decisions through the task force. Twice a week, we hold a federal task-force meeting with the regions and all our companies. Essentially, the process is being managed manually,’ Novak said
Meanwhile, Ukrainian drones attacked the Nizhnekamsk refinery late last week. It was the second major attack on the facility in August alone and the third in the past year.
Still from a video posted on X
Serious damage to such refineries can take several months to repair. Russia’s refining industry is therefore operating in a state of constant recovery from continuing Ukrainian attacks. There are signs, however, that officials are finally considering not only repairs but also ways of preventing damage to refineries. It is becoming increasingly difficult for government officials to explain why even passive protection measures have not been installed at key infrastructure facilities. Why have oil storage facilities been protected in Arab countries while Russia still lacks such measures? Especially since anti-drone structures are not particularly unique or technologically complex.
‘Last week, a major state-owned company approached me after receiving an instruction from the relevant ministry to equip its facilities with this kind of protection. It came right from the top. The request was simple: how can we build protective structures without ending up in prison for doing so?’ says Alexei Chadayev, head of the Ushkuynik research and production centre. ‘The main way for people responsible for spending state money to protect themselves is to refer to an existing government instruction that they can use when planning expenditure. The problem, however, is that there are no existing domestic instructions on passive protection against drones. Nobody has had time to develop and adopt them,’ the expert explains. Novak’s remarks about continuous efforts to improve the security of oil refineries should therefore be interpreted in the broadest possible sense
To avoid prosecution over the construction of anti-drone structures, oil company executives would be well advised to obtain approval from the local air-defence command. ‘They will not simply put their signatures on recommendations. So a kind of barter may be possible. For example, you buy a good radar at your own expense, because they are always short of them, integrate it into their detection system, and it becomes part of the document you need from air defence,’ Chadayev explains.
‘Once you have received that document from the military, you go to your relevant ministry. You ask them, preferably with an order that you have prepared in advance yourself, to issue an instruction from the ministry’s industry task force to the company to organise passive protection in accordance with the military’s recommendations,’ the expert says, outlining the required preliminary approvals.
Military personnel, security officials and officials from the relevant ministry should be invited to sign the acceptance certificate, and ideally prosecutors as well. ‘The prosecutor’s office does not take part in signing the acceptance certificate, but it will later audit your expenditure,’ Chadayev explains. Even full compliance with such a procedure, however, provides no complete guarantee against a possible investigation or financial claims
Experts also point to strict regulatory requirements governing anti-drone structures. These require the specific design to be approved by several agencies and to comply with the relevant rules for petroleum-product storage facilities and fire-safety requirements.
‘There are no regulations that permit fuel tanks to be covered with any kind of net. So there is only one legal route for building passive protection: special technical conditions approved through the Emergencies Ministry and the Construction Ministry. Anyone who builds without the necessary paperwork faces fines of up to RUB 1 mln, disqualification of the director, recognition of the structure as an unauthorised construction subject to demolition at the owner’s expense, and suspension of operations for up to 90 days,’ political consultant Igor Dimitriev says. The question of how to finance the construction of protective structures is another issue. ‘Companies’ spending on their own protection could be classified as unplanned capital expenditure not provided for in any investment programme, followed by an audit and potentially a charge of abuse of authority against the person who signed off on it,’ the expert warns. The Defence Ministry is also unlikely to be interested in financing protection for private assets, Dimitriev suggests.
ORIGINAL: NG/Is There a Way Out of the Fuel Crisis without Protecting Infrastructure?
